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IWEST VIRGINIA LAW QUA.TERLY
JUDICIAL SALBS.0
By F. C. LEFTWICH.*
A judicial sale is one which is made by a court of competent
jurisdiction in a pending suit, through its authorized agent. It is
the act of the court and not of the agent.
Thete are various kinds of suits in which sales of property are
authorized and made in this State. We have what is known as
suits for the sale of lands for the benefit of the school fund; suits
by guardians and committees for the renting or sale of infants'
and insane persons' lands, and what is known as creditors' suits.
Sales may be made in various other kinds of suits; but these are
the most common.
SALES MADE FOR BENEFIT OF SCHOOL FUND.
As to suits made for the sale of lands for the benefit of the school
fund, section 6 of chapter 105 of the Code provides that, upon the
filing and recording of the report of the commissioner of school
lands, showing lands, from any cause, forfeited to the State for
non-payment of taxes, a suit or suits in chancery shall be com-
menced and prosecuted in the name of the State of West Virginia,
for the sale of such lands, as required by section four of article
thirteen of the Constitution; that all such tracts of land, not ex-
ceeding in quantity one thousand acres, may be included in one
suit, but a separate suit may be brought and prosecuted for the
sale of each tract exceeding one thousand acres; that the former
owner of any such tract at the time of the forfeiture, or the per-
son in whose name the same is forfeited, shall, if known, be made
a defendant, and all persons claiming title to or interest in any such
lands shall, also, as far as known, be made defendants; and that
any person claiming an interest in any such lands or in the proceeds
thereof, not made defendant, may file his petition stating what
* Paper read before the Cabell County Bar Association.
** Member of the Cabell County Bar.
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interest he claims, either in court, or before a commissioner in
chancery while the suit is pending before him, or at rules, and
become a defendant.
All such suits shall be commenced as provided in chapter 124
of the Code, and proceeded in, heard and determined as other
suits in chancery and subject to the same rules. And all ques-
tions of title between former owners and claimants may be liti-
gated in such suits; provided the land is forfeited.
Therefore this proceeeding is often used by adverse claimants
to settle thi title to lands where they are not in a position to go
into ejectment. Say there are two or more distinct claims of title
to the same land, and one or more of the titles are forfeited to
the State. The owner of the forfeited title will have the commis-
sioner of school lands report the land as forfeited, upon which re-
port a suit will be brought to sell the land, and he and all other
claimants are made defendants. Then the court has to decide
who had the better title at the time of forfeiture, unless the title
has been transferred to some claimant under section three of
article thirteen of the Constitution.
This proceeding is a judicial proceeding, in the nature of a pro-
ceeding against the land itself, and a sale thereunder, when com-
pleted is prima facie evidence against all persons whomsoever, and
no error in the proceeding which does not effect the court's juris-
diction, will render the sale thereunder void. The jurisdiction of
the circuit court under this chapter, is that of a court of general
jurisdiction. The court has complete equitable jurisdiction of the
land, and in a collateral proceeding no proof of the existence of
facts essential to jurisdiction is required, nor can the same be re-
ceived to dispute their existence. It will be presumed that the court
ascertained the existence of those facts giving it jurisdiction, be-
fore it entered a decree of sale.'
It was held, under the old school land Act of 1872-3, that the
proceeding for the sale of lands for the benefit of the school fund
was not a judicial proceeding, but was administrative in character,
being simply a mode prescribed by the State for the sale of her
lands, as her absolute property, and in which the State alone was
interested. And that the former owner was not interested in the
land, and was, therefore, not a proper party to the proceeding.
2
1 Lawson v. Hart, 40 W. Va. 52, 20 S. E. 819 (1894) ; Cecil v. Clark, 44 W. Va.
659, 30 S. E. 216 (1898) ; Starr v. Sampselle, 55 W. Va. 442, 47 S. E. 255 (1904) ;
State v. Jackson, 56 W. Va. 558, 49 S. E. 465 (1904; King v. Mulllns, 171 U. S.
404 (1898).
2 McClure v. Maitland, 24 W. Va. 561 (1884) ; McClure v. Mauperture, 29 W. Va.
633, 2 S. E. 761 (1887).
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There were grave doubts, however, as to the constitutionality of
the Act of 1872-3, as construed by our court, because owners were
being deprived of their property without being given the right to
to come into court and dispute the right of the State to sell it.
It also resulted, in some cases, in a number of people trying to
build up titles to the same property, as it was the practice of the
courts to allow any one, who could set up any kind of claim to the
land, to come in and redeem it from forfeiture and have the re-
demption treated as a sale. There was no way to settle the title
to the land under this proceeding and the courts would allow all
the claimants to redeem the same land.
So, the legislature of 1891, amended the law so as to provide
that a regular suit should be brought in the name of the State, in
which the former owner and all other persons claiming any inter-
est ii the land should be made defendants. And our Supreme
Court has held that all such owners and claimants are necessary
parties, and that no decree is binding upon them unless they are
made parties to the suit and served with process, or come in and ask
to be made parties. And, also, that if a claimant is known or his
claim can be ascertained by the use of reasonable diligence, he
cannot be proceeded against under the general designation of
"unknown claimants.
Therefore, as the law now is, all conflicting titles to lands may
be adjudicated in a suit to sell the land as forfeited and a decree
in such suit settling the tile as binding upon all who are made par-
ties to the suit.'
SALE OF LANDS OF PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY.
If there is any class of judicial sales that has given the legal pro-
fession more trouble than any other, it is sales of lands of persons
under disability.
Guardians of infants and committees of insane persons have no
power to sell the lands of their wards, unless authorized to do so by
the courts in the manner prescribed by statute. They may rent
their ward's real estate and account for the profits thereof. But
it is held that without authority from the court, a guardian cannot
lease the land of his ward for oil or gas, or for other developments. 5
3 Bennett v. Preston, 59 W. Va. 681, 53 S. E. 562 (1906); Blake v. O'Neal, 63
W. Va. 483, 61 S. E. 410 (1908); Preston v. Bennett, 67 W. Va. 392, 68 S. E.
45 (1910).
4 State v. Harman, 57 W. Va. 447, 50 S. E. 828 (1905) ; State v. King, 64 W. Va.
610, 63 S. B. 495 (1908) ; King v. Buskirk, 196 Fed. 299 (1912).
. Wilson v. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826, 28 S. E. 781 (1897) ; Haskell v. Sutton, 53
W. Va. 206, 44 S. B. 533 (1903).
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Section 2 of chapter 83 of the Code provides that the guardian
of a minor, or the committee of an insane person may, when they
think the interest of the ward or insane person will be promoted
by a lease, mortgage, deed of trust, or sale of his estate, or estate in
which he is interested, file a bill in equity in the circuit court for
the purpose of obtaining such sale, lease, mortgage or deed of
trust. This section also provides that a trustee of an estate, or any
person interested in a trust estate, may, under like circumstances
file a bill for the purpose of leasing, mortgaging or selling the
same.
Courts of equity have no inherent power to sell lands of infants
or insane persons, and can only do so as authorized by the fore-
going, or some other statute.'
In this kind of suit as well as in all other suits, all parties in-
terested in the estate to be sold should be made parties. But it
has been held that, in a proceeding by a committee of an insane
person under this chapter to sell the undivided interest of such
insane person in the oil and gas underlying a tract of land, his
co-tenants are not necessary parties.
7
This would apply as well to the undivided interest of infants or
insane persons in the whole of a tract of land; because one co-ten-
ant has no interest in his co-tenant's property, and a decree of sale
of an infant or insane person's interest in the common property
would not affect his co-tenant's interest, but the purchaser would
take the place of the infant or insane person and become a co-ten-
ant with those owning the other undivided interests in the
property.
It is not sufficient, in a bill of this character, to state that the
plaintiff thinks or believes that a sale would promote the interest
of the infant; but he should set forth all the facts calculated to
show the propriety of the sale, and should set forth all the prop-
erty owned by the infant, both real and personal. And the bill
must be verified by the oath of the plaintiff. A guardian ad litem
should be appointed for the infant or insane person and the guar-
dian ad litem and the infant, if over fourteen years old, should an-
swer under oath. And no decree of sale is valid unless these stat-
utory requirements have been complied with.8
e Hoback v. Miller, 44 W. Va. 635, 29 S. E. 1014 (1898) ; Conrad v,. Crouch, 68
W. Va. 378, 69 S. E. 888 (1910).
7 South Penn Oil Co. v. McIntire, 44 W. Va. 296, 28 S. E. 922 (1898).
a Piercy's Heirs v. Piercy, 5 W. Va. 199 (1872) ; Hull v. Hull, 26 W. Va. 1
(1885) ; Hart v. Hart, 31 W. Va. 688, 8 S. E. 562 (1888) ; Eakin v. Hawkins, 52
W. Va. 124-130, 43 S. E. 211 (1902).
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1923], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol29/iss3/3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
It is also necessary that the guardian ad litem be present at the
taking of all depositions in the case, as no deposition can be read
in the case, except by permission of the court, unless taken in the
presence of the guardian ad litem, or upon interrogatories agreed
upon by him.
If all the requirements of the statute are substantially complied
with, the court acquires jurisdiction of both the parties and the
subject matter of the suit, and a decree of sale, though erroneous,
becomes conclusive and binding upon all the parties, both infants
and adults.9
The statute requires that it be clearly shown, independently of
any admissions in the answers, that the interest of the infant or
insane jerson will be promoted by a sale.
As .to whether such showing has been made in a particular case,
I take it, is a matter for the circuit court to decide, in the first
instance, subject to appeal and review by the Supreme Court of
Appeals. And if not appealed from, the decision of the circuit
court could not be reviewed or attacked in any other way, except
by the infant within six months after he attains his majority.
This chapter also provides for the investment of the proceeds of
sales of lands made under it, but the question as to whether or
not an erroneous decree as to how the proceeds shall be invested can
have any effect upon the title of the purchaser, does not seem to
have been decided by our Supreme Court of Appeals.
In the case of Ammons v. Ammons, ° the court held that:
"When the real estate so sold is an estate in remainder, created
by a devise to the daughter of the testator for her natural life,
remainder in fee to her heirs, and the sale is made upon the
application of the guardian of her children, her children born
after such sule, are deemed to have been before the court by
representation, and can claim no interest except in the fund
arising from the sale, and in it they are entitled to share equally
with the others."
The court then propounds the following:
"Quaere, whether said principal of representation is qual-
ified to the extent that a decree of sale, which fails to provide
for, and protect the interest of persons not in esse and so deemed
before the court, by substituting the fund from the sale of the
land in place of it, and preserving the fund to the extent neces-
Parker v. McCoy, 10 Gratt. 594 (1854) ; Zirkle v. McCue, 67 Va. 171 (1875)
Rbea v. Shields, 103 Va. 305, 49 S. E. 70 (1904) ; Tomblin v. Peck, 73 W. Va. 336
80 S. E. 450 (1913).
10 50 W. Va. 390, 40 S. E. 490 (1901).
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sary to satisfy such interests, is ineffectual to pass their title
to the purchaser."
Cases of this character do not often arise, but it is well to keep the
question in mind and see that proper distribution is made of the
proceeds of such sales.
In addition to the regular suit in chancery authorized by the
second section of chapter 83 of the Code, section 12 of the same
chapter provides for what is known as a summary proceeding for
the sale or lease, or mortgaging of estates of infants and insane
persons. This proceeding is instituted by giving the defendants
ten days' notice and filing a petition setting up the facts showing
the necessity or desirability of sale; which petition should set forth
all the facts required in a regular bill in chancery for the same
purpose. The petition must be verified and a guardian ad litem
appointed for the infant or insane defendant. The section (See.
13) requires that a guardian ad litem be appointed, but does not
require him to file an answer, but says he shall be present at the
hearing. But our Supreme Court seems to be of the opinion that
section 3 of this chapter applies in the summary proceeding, as
well as in the regular chancery suit, and holds in Sinnett v. Goff,11
that in a summary proceeding, it is necessary that the guardian ad
litem, as well as the infants, if over 14 years of age, should answer
the petition on oath.
Notwithstanding this decision, I do not think the court would
hold a sale to be void, in a case where there was no answer by the
guardian ad litem in a summary proceeding, where it appeared
that there was a guardian ad litem appointed, and was present at
the hearing, as the court holds in this same case that there is no
legal difference in effect between a decree in favor of or against
an infant and a decree in favor of or against an adult, as neither
can impeach or invalidate it except for fraud, collusion, or error
in its procurement. And, also, in the case of French v. Pocahontas
Coal & Coke, Co.,12 the court holds that to effectuate a regular and
unimpeachable sale of the real estate of an infant by this proceed-
ing it is necessary to comply substantially with all of the require-
ments of the statute, and specifically with such of them as relate to
jurisdiction of the property to be sold and the persons interested
therein. And in this connection the court says, in the same case,
that it is essential that the infant whose land is sought to be sold,
have ten days' notice; but the omission of such notice does not ren-
89 W. Va. 629. 109 S. E. 820 (1921).
87 W. Va. 226, 104 S. B. 554 (1920).
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der the sale absolutely void, but voidable only, when properly
assailed in due time by the infant; that the statute is remedial, and,
properly construed authorizes judicial ratification of a sale infirm
and defective in point of procedure only, and that sales of real
property of an infant, which are beneficial to the infant owner,
will not be set aside on the ground of irregularities therein. The
court also says in this case that:
"The plain purpose of Code c. 83, providing for sales of lands
of infants, was to give courts of equity a jurisdiction which, in
most states, they possessed inherently to represent and act for
infants under all circumstances affecting their property rights,
and to be in law and fact their guardians, possessed of greater
authority than ordinary guardians, and to confer a new juris-
diction on courts of equity, and hence the statute should be lib-
erally construed."
Of course an infant has until six months after attaining the age
-of twenty-one years to show cause against such a decree, which he
may do by original bill, bill of review, supplemental bill in the
nature of a bill of review, petition or answer, but in order to set
it aside he must make such a showing as would avail an adult on
appeal from the same decree; or such a showing as would avail an
adult in an original suit or bill of review seeking to set it aside.'3
The hearing upon the petition in the summary proceeding is had
in open court, and usually upon oral evidence. The statute does
not provide that the evidence shall be taken down and preserved;
but I presume it may be done, in which case it would be available
on appeal or other attack on the decree. But, if the evidence is
not preserved, and the court finds and states in its decree that it
was clearly shown by the petition, exhibits and evidence adduced,
that the interest of the minor would be promoted by a sale of his
real estate, and that the rights of no person would be affected
thereby; then there is no way, so far as I know, by which the in-
fant, or anyone else, can attack the decree upon the ground that
the sale was not to the interest of the infant.
The statute provides that neither the guardian nor the guardian
ad litem shall be a purchaser, directly or indirectly at a sale made
under this chapter. This would, I think, be true, even if the stat-
ute was silent about it, under the general doctrine that one occu-
pying a fiduciary relation to another is bound not to exercise for
his own benefit and to the prejudice of the party, to whom he
23 Lafferty v. Lafferty, 42 W. Va. 783, 26 S. E. 262 (1896).
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stands in such relation, any of the powers or rights, or any knowl-
edge or advantage of any description, which he derives from such
a relation, and such purchase may be avoided at the option of the
party to whom he holds such fiduciary relation. This option
would follow to one who purchases from such fiduciary, provided
he had notice of the illegal purchase by the fiduciary. But if he
had no such notice, the remedy would be by suit against the fidu-
ciary for the profits made in the transaction."4
In the case of a sale of infant's land, under this chapter, there
could hardly be an innocent purchaser, because the record would
show who the guardian and guardian ad litem were, and if one of
them was the purchaser the record would show it.
SALES IN CREDITORS' SUITS.
The most important principles applicable to judicial sales are
those applicable to sales made in suits to enforce judgment liens
and for the collection of other debts, and being most important,
are more familiar to lawyers, and for that reason should be briefly
treated in a paper of this character.
We have in this State what is known as suits, under chapter
139 of the Code, by judgment creditors to enfore their judgment
by sale of the real estate of the judgment debtor, after an execution
has been returned showing that no personal property can be found
out of which the judgment can be collected. And we have what
is known as suits by the creditors of a decedent to subject the real
estate of which he died seized to the payment of his debts. And
we also have what is known as suits to set aside fraudulent and
voluntary conveyances made by debtors and subject to sale the
lands so conveyed to the payment of the debts of the grantors.
In a judgmnt creditors' suit, all interested parties should be
made parties to the suit, including the judgment debtor, or his
widow, if he be dead, and all persons holding judgments or other
liens against the property sought to be sold. And in case there is
a deed of trust on the property the trustee therein must also be
made a party, in order to have the legal title before the court. It
is not absolutely necessary that all judgment creditors be made
parties to the bill, as they can come in by petition, or appear
before the commissioner and prove their claims, and thus become
parties; but all who have their judgments docketed should be
24 Newcomb v. Brooks, 16 W. Va. 32 (1S79): Plant v. Humphries, 66 W. Va.
88, 66 S. E. 94 (1909).
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made parties to the bill, as they might fail to come in, in which
case the decree would be reversed on appeal; and if there was no
appeal, the lien would still be valid and the purchaser would not
be protected.1"
Where a judgment creditor has a judgment against two parties
and one of them only owns real estate, it is not necessary to make
the one who does not own any real estate a party to a suit to enforce
the judgment against the other party's real estate."
Where a judgment at law is in favor of A for the benefit of B,
the judgment cannot be enforced in a chancery suit brought by
A for the benefit of B, but the suit should be brought by B in
his own right."
Where one creditor brings a suit in behalf of himself and all
other creditors, making the other creditors parties, or, if he does
not make them formal parties, where they come in and have them-
selves made parties, the plaintiff does not have control of the case,
and it cannot be dismissed on his motion. If the plaintiff's lien is
paid off during the pendency of the suit, the suit may be dismissed
as to him, but cannot be dismissed as to the other creditors without
their consent. Usually the suit proceeds in the name of the original
plaintiff, and must so proceed unless an order is entered substi-
tuting another plaintiff. 8
The usual procedure is for the plaintiff to file his bill making
all persons who have liens recorded in the county court clerk's
office defendants, along with the owner of the land sought to be
sold, filing with his bill a copy of his judgment and a copy from the
judgment lien docket showing that his judgment has been dock-
eted. The cause is then referred to a commissioner, who goes to the
judgment lien docket and gets the dates and amounts of the judg-
ments and the time at which they were docketed; and from this
data he makes up his report. This may be all right where the
judgments are admitted, but where the judgments are not admit-
ted, the fact that a judgment appears on the lien docket is not suf-
'5 Hoffman v. Shields, 4 W. Va. 490 (1871) ; Dickinson v,. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 7
W. Va. 390 (1874) ; Neely v. Jones, 16 W. Va. 625 (1880) ; Norris V. Bean, 17 W.
Va. 655 (1881) ; Bank v. Bates, 20 W. Va. 210 (1882) ; Livesay v'. Feamster, 21
W. Va. 83 (1882) ; Jackson's Admr. v,. Hull, 21 W. Va. 601 (1883); Bilmyer v.
Sherman, 23 W. Va. 656 (1884) ; Grove v. Judy, 24 W. Va. 294 (1884) ; Pappen-
heimer v. Roberts, 24 W. Va. 702 (1884) ; McNeil's Ex'rs. v. Auldridge, 25 W. Va.
113 (1884) ; McMillin v. Hickman. 35 W. Va. 705, 14 S. E. 227 (1891) ; Bank v.
Watson, 39 W. Va. 342, 19 S. E. 413 (1894) ; Calvert v. Ash, 47 W. Va. 480, 88
S. E. 887 (1900).
10 Howard v. Stephenson, 33 W. Va. 116, 10 S. B. 66 (1889).
27 Kellam v. Sayre, 30 W. Va. 198, 3 S. E. 589 (1887).
Is Linsey v. McGannon, 9 W. Va. 154 (1876); Bilmyer v. Sherman, 23 W. Va.
656 (1884) ; Lewis v. Laidley, 39 W. Va. 422, 19 S. E. 378 (1894) ; Shumate's
Ex'rs. v. Crockett, 43 W. Va. 491, 23 S. E. 240 (1897).
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ficient proof of a valid judgment. So the judgment creditors, who
are made defendants, should file certified copies of their judgments
with the commissioner, along with a certified copy from the judg-
ment lien docket. If they fail to do this, and objection is made,
they may lose their right to enforce their judgments, or at least
their right to priority and have to come in and take any surplus
that may be left after payment of the judgments which have been
properly proven.
The circuit court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of
judgments sought to be enforced and ascertain the amounts and
priorities of all liens.19
Of course they cannot go behind the judgment and let in de-
fenses that should have been made at the time the judgment was
obtained, but they have the right to require proof that a valid
judgment exists, and a properly authenticated copy of the judg-
ment is sufficient proof that a judgment exists.2
Where there are infant defendants it is the duty of the court to
examine the evidence upon which the commissioner's report is
based, whether the report is excepted to or not, and if the court
confirms such report in the absence of sufficient evidence to estab-
lish the existence of a judgment and decrees a sale, the appellate
court will reverse the decree. 2
It is held in Snyder v. Botkin, 2 that where statute enactments
do not interfere, a judgment creditor can acquire no better right to
the estate of the debtor than the debtor himself has when the
judgment is recovered. He takes it subject to every liability under
which the debtor holds it, and subject to all the equities which ex-
ist in favor of third parties; and a court of equity will limit the
lien of the judgment to the actual interest which the debtor has in
the estate. And section 5 of chapter 74 of the Code provides that
every contract for the conveyance of real estate, and every deed,
deed of trust or mortgage, conveying real estate or personal prop-
erty, shall be void as to creditors and subsequent purchasers for
valuable consideration without notice, until it is duly admitted to
record.
Notwithstanding this statute the court further held in this case
that where A sells land to B by parol contract, and B takes pos-
session and has possession at the time the judgment is obtained and
19 Smoot v. Newberry 8 W. Va. 400 (1875) ; Scott v. Ludington, 14 W. Va. 387
(1878) ; Sperry v. Sanders, 50 W. Va. 70, 40 S. E. 327 (1901).
Dickinson v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 7 W. Va. 390 (1874).
-" Laidley v. Kline, 8 W. Va. 218 (1875).
22 37 W. Va. 355, 16 S. E. 591 (1892).
10
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docketed against A and shortly before the Judgment was obtained
B obtained a deed from A, which is not recorded at the time the
judgment is obtained, the judgment creditor cannot enforce his
judgment against the land.
So, it is the law in this State that an unrecorded deed is void as
to creditors, unless the grantee has been placed in actual open pos-
session of the land in such manner as would vest in him the right
to have specific performance, if he had purchased by parol agree-
ment; and in case a bona fide purchaser, either by parol or unre-
corded contract, is in position to compel his vender to specifically
perform his contract, he will be protected against judgments ob-
tained and docketed after he has so purchased and taken pos-
session.
3
A decree of sale should set out specifically the nature, amounts
and priorities of the liens and to whom due; and should give a rea-
sonable time in which the creditor may make payment. A decree
of sale which refers to the commissioners' report for the nature,
amounts and priorities of the liens is not sufficient, and it is re-
versible error to fail to give the creditor a time in which to make
payment.24
Under section 7 of chapter 86 of the Code, where the personal
estate of a decedent is insufficient for the payment of his debts,
his executor or administrator may bring a suit in equity, within six
months after his qualification, to subject the lands of the decedent
to the payment of his debts. The widow, heirs and devisees, if any,
and all known creditors of the decedent shall be made parties. If
the executor or administrator does not institute such suit within six
months after his qualification then any creditor of the decedent
may institute such suit on behalf of himself and the other cred-
itors, making the personal representative, widow, heirs and devi-
sees, if any, parties. And any creditor, whether made a party or
not, may present and prove his claim, and will be deemed to have
been made a party.
The widow, as such, cannot bring a creditor's suit at any time;
but if she is also executrix or administratrix she may bring the
suit in that capacity, within six months after her qualification.
The statute simply gives the personal representative the exclusive
= Biern io. Ray, 49 W. Va. 129, 38 S. E. 530 (1901) ; Smith v. Gott, 51 W. Va.
141, 41 S. E. 175 (1902); Westinghouse Lamp Co. v. Ingram, 70 W. Va. 664, 74
S. E. 941 (1912) ; Westinghouse Lamp Co. v. Ingram, 79 W. Va. 220, 90 S. E. 837
(1916).
24 Anderson v. Nagle, 12 W. Va. 98 (1877) ; Scott p. Ludington, 14 W. Va. 387
(1878) ; Trimble v. Herold, 20 W. Va. 602 (1882) ; McCleary V. Grantham, 29 W.
Va. 301, 11 S. E. 949 (1886) ; Hart v. Hart, 31 W. Va. 688, 8 S. E. 562 (1888)
King v. Burdett, 44 W. Va. 561, 562, 29 S. E. 1010 (1898).
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right to bring the suit within six months; but in either case it must
appear that there is not sufficient personal property to pay the
debts. However, the authority for a creditor to bring suit to sub-
ject the lands of a decedent to the payment of his debts is not de-
rived from the statute, but exists independently of the statute, but
under the statute he has to wait, under ordinary circumstances,
six months after the qualification of the personal representative.25
But in proper case, a bill of discovery against the personal rep-
resentative to discover assets liable to the payment of the debts,
may be filed by a creditor at any time. And such a suit may be
carried on as a general creditor's suit.
20
The personal representative is not limited to six months after his
qualification to bring such a suit; but he may bring it any time
before suit is brought by a creditor.
27
The object of this statute is to secure a just and equitable distri-
bution of a decedent's estate among his creditors; and no good is
accomplished by obtaining a judgment at law against the personal
representative, as such a judgment gives no priority over other
creditors, and would not be sufficient evidence to prove the judg-
inent creditor's claim.28
The order in which the different dnds of property constituting
the decedent's estate, will be subjected to the payment of his
debts is as follows :29
First, personal estate at large not exempted by law;
Second, real estate set apart by will for the payment of debts;
Third, real estate descended to heirs;
Fourth, property expressly charged with payment of debts and
then devised;
Fifth, general pecuniary legacies;
Sixth, specific legacies, and
Seventh, real estate devised.
If a creditor of an estate of a decedent fail to present his claim
before a decree, upon the report of a commissisioner, allowing debts
against the estate, and subjecting lands to their payment, such
decree bars him from participation in the proceeds of sale of such
lands until such debts as have been presented and decreed are
5 Reinhardt v. Relnhardt, 21 W. Va. 76 (1882) ; Cranmer v. McSwords, 24 W.
Va. 594 (1884) ; Broderick v. Broderick, 28 W. Va. 378 (1886).
- Poling v. Huffman, 39 W. Va. 320, 19 S. E. 421 (1894).
- Relnhardt v. Relnhardt, &pra, note 24; Moore v. Lignon, 22 W. Va. 302 (1883).
Rex v. Creel, 22 W. Va. 373 (1883) ; Gardner's Adm'r. v. Gardner's Heirs, 47
W. Va. 368, 34 S. E. 792 (1899).
LD Cramner v. MIcSwords, 24 W. Va. 594 (1884); Daingerfield v. Smith, 83 Va.
81, 1 S. E. 599 (1887).
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satisfied. He may prove his claim and have it paid out of the sur-
plus, if any.30
All of the errors which-may be committed in creditors' suits,
that are not jurisdictional, may be corrected on appeal, or, in the
ease of infants, within six months after they attain the age of
twenty-one years; but it is sometimes hard to determine what errors
are jurisdictional and what are not.
A case illustrating this difficulty is the case of Beal v. Wood.3 1
This was a case where a father died in debt, owning certain real
estate, and leaving a widow and a number of infant children liv-
ing. After his death his widow was appointed administratrix of
his estate, and within six months after qualification she brought
suit to subject the lands of her deceased husband to the payment
of his debts. And while this suit was pending, and within ten
months after the death of her husband another child was born to
the widow. This child not being in life when the suit was brought
was of course not made a party to it; but the suit was carried on
in the names of the original parties and decrees of sale were en-
tered and sales made and confirmed, and deeds made to purchasers.
The infant born after the death of her father, did not seek to
have these decrees and sales set aside within six months after
attaining the age of twenty-one years; but when she was twenty-
three or four years old she brought an independent suit claiming
an interest in the lands, because she was not made a party to the
suit to sell the same, and, therefore, claiming that the court was
without jurisdiction to sell her interest in them.
The court held that it was error not to make the infant a party
when she came into life; but as she could not be made a party at
the time when the suit was brought, and all were made parties
who could have been made parties, the court acquired jurisdiction
of the persons and property; and that owing to the fact that other
heirs who occupied the same position that she would have occupied
had she been born before the suit was brought, she was an indirect
party by representation, and the fact that she was not made a
direct party did not divest the court of jurisdiction.
The court bases its decision upon the general rules that "The
test of jurisdiction is whether the tribunal has power to enter upon
the inquiry, and not whether its conclusions in the course of it
were right or wrong," and that "The authority to decide being
once shown, it can never be divested by being improperly or erron-
w Trail v. Trail, 56 w. Va. 594 (1904).
1 70 W. Va. 383, 73 S. E. 978 (1912).
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eously employed." And it gives as an illustration a case where
the court obtains jurisdiction of a defendant while living it may
proceed with the case to judgment after he is dead; and says
that, in such a case, the court ought to cease to exercise jurisdiction
over the party when he dies, but its failure to do so is an error to
be corrected on appeal or writ of error.
Sales of real estate may be made in suits for partition, as well
as some other kinds of suits; but the time allowed will not per-
mit me to discuss them. A full discussion of all the principles
applicable to judicial sales cannot be expected in a paper of this
character. However, I have endeavored to point out as many as
I could of the mistakes of the past, in order that they may be
avoided in the future.
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